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Abstract
Sanchez Villalba (2015) claims inspection games can be modelled as global games
when agents face common shocks. For the tax evasion game his leading examplehe
prescribes that the tax agency should audit each individual taxpayer with a probabil-
ity that is a non-decreasing function of every other taxpayers declarations (relative
auditing strategy).
This paper uses experimental data to test the predictions of the model and nds
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the relative auditing strategy is superior
to the alternative cut-o¤one.
It also nds that data t the qualitative predictions of the global game model,
regarding both participantsdecisions and the experiments comparative statics.
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1 Introduction
Common income shocks that a¤ect rather homogeneous agents in similar ways are well
documented: the fact that airlines sales plummeted after 9/11, chicken breeders faced
low demand after the avian u outbreak, and emergent markets have di¢ culties attracting
investors every time the U. S. Federal Reserve increases interest rates are just a few examples
one can bring forward. Furthermore, they show that often these shocks are the main source
of income variability, greatly overshadowing the signicance of idiosyncratice shocks.
Hence, it is not surprising that a tax agency that ignores common shocks will choose a
clearly suboptimal auditing strategy. But this is exactly what happens if they follow the
most popular policy prescribed by the literature: the cut-o¤ rule(Reinganum and Wilde
(1985)). It states that the agency should not audit any rm that declares above a certain
xed cut-o¤ income level, and should audit with a su¢ ciently high probability those who
declare below it. Combined with common income shocks, this policy leads to systematic
mistargeting: the agency audits too muchin bad years and too littlein good ones.
In this scenario, Sanchez Villalba (2015) nds that the agencys optimal policy (named
relative auditing strategyby the author) consists in auditing every rm with a probability
that is a non-decreasing function of every other taxpayers declarations. This is because
other rmsdeclarations give the agency information about the realisation of the shock and
so the probability of a given taxpayer being an evader is (weakly) higher the higher are her
fellow taxpayersdeclarations.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to test Sanchez Villalba (2015)s model (henceforth,
GIG model, or Global Inspection Gamemodel). This is a relevant task because it will
help determining which of the alternative rules (relative or cut-o¤) is superior to the other
and, indirectly, whether the data is consistent with the modelling of tax evasion as a global
game and its associated predictions.
However, real-world data on tax evasion is not readily available. Those who engage in tax
evasion are not willing to indicate it for obvious reasons, but also tax agencies are reluctant
to provide data because of the condentiality of tax returns: even if the datapoints are not
labelled, in many cases it is quite easy to identify which individual rm they belong to, thus
revealing sensitive information that could a¤ect the company negatively.
For this reason, the current paper will use the second-best available dataset, namely, the one
collected in a computerized experiment in which participants interacted with each other in
situations that resembled the scenario described by the GIG model. This methodology has
the obvious disadvantage of making di¢ cult the extrapolation of results from the sample
to the population, but it gives the experimenter a greater control over the variables under
study and in the case of tax evasion it is, as mentioned before, the only available one anyway.
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The econometric analysis nds that the agency is better o¤when using the relative rule than
when using the cut-o¤ one, and so that the key prediction of the GIG model is strongly
supported. It also supports the hypothesis that people make decisions (qualitatively) con-
sistent with higher-order beliefs (which play an important role in ensuring the uniqueness
of the global game equilibrium) and that the comparative statics follow the ones predicted
by the global game technique.
To the best of my knowledge, nobody tested empirically (using either real-world or exper-
imental data) the predictions of a GIG-like model, but plenty of laboratory experiments
were framed as/based on tax compliance problems. The closest reference is Alm and McKee
(2004), which analyses tax evasion as a coordination game. In contrast, the present analysis
considers it as a global game, which requires not only the strategic uncertainty generated
by the coordination game but also the fundamental uncertainty created by the incom-
pleteness of information regarding the payo¤ functions. Tests of the global game technique
seem to support it in terms of predictive power (Cabrales et al. (2007)) and/or compara-
tive statics (Heinemann et al. (2004)), but are less supportive of the participantsuse of
higher-order beliefs when making decisions. The latter result is also the conclusion of
other studies, like Stahl and Wilson (1994) and Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes Sanchez Villalba (2015)s
theoretical model and its predictions. Section 3 explains the experimental design and the
testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results and nally section 5 concludes.
2 Tax Evasion as a Global Game
The global game methodology (Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2002))
is a mechanism that, thanks to the existence of some uncertainty about the payo¤ functions
of the players, selects one of the multiple equilibria of a coordination game.
Sanchez Villalba (2015) claims that, in the presence of common income shocks, tax evasion
can be modelled as a global game because the agencys optimal policy generates a coordi-
nation game and taxpayers imperfect information about the agencys type creates the
uncertainty about payo¤s.
Drawing on the fact that most tax agencies worldwide partition the population of taxpayers
into categories where members share some non-manipulable characteristics, he analyses the
agencys problem within each one of them. The high degree of homogeneity within a category
implies that the idiosyncratic shocks will be small compared to the common ones, and so,
for all practical purposes, one can assume that every member has the same income y: it is
high (y = 1) in goodyears (which occur with probability ) and low (y = 0) in bad
ones (with probability 1  ).
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The situation is thus modelled as a one-shot game, with the following timing: in the rst
stage all actors learn their private information; in the second one taxpayers submit their
declarations and; in the third stage the agency (after observing all declarations) undertakes
audits (if any). An agencys private information is its type, parameterized by  and
interpreted as the e¤ective budget the agency has for undertaking audits. In turn, the
private information of a taxpayer i consists of her income yi 2 f0; 1g and her signal si :=
+ "i, where "i is a white noise error term. This signal embodies all the information about
the agencys type available to the taxpayer (news, previous experience, conversations with
colleagues/friends, etc.). All actors (taxpayers and agency) know every parameter of the
game and their own private information. They also know the probability distributions of
other actorsprivate information, but not their realizations.1
Every taxpayer has to decide how much income to declare, di 2 f0; 1g, in order to maximize
her expected utility. The optimal declaration strategy follows the standard literature except
for the fact that, since the exact probability of detection ai is unknown to the taxpayer, her
declaration will be a (weakly) increasing function of her belief about ai.
The agency chooses ai in order to minimize the expected losses associated with making tar-
geting errors, subject to the e¤ective budget constraint determined by its type . Targeting
errors can take two forms: zeal errors (Z) occur when resources are wasted on auditing
compliant taxpayers; negligence errors (N) take place when evaders are not caught and
the corresponding nes are not collected.2 The agency minimizes a loss function that
aggregates errors into one metric and can be written as L = N +(1  )Z, where  is the
loss associated with letting an evader get away with her evasion.
Sanchez Villalba (2015) found that the agencys optimal auditing policy regarding taxpayer
i, ai, is (weakly) increasing in the agencys type, , and the declarations of every other
taxpayer in the category, dj , j 6= i. The last result is especially important because it
generates a negative externality between taxpayers: the higher the declaration of a taxpayer
j, the higher the probability that another taxpayer i (i 6= j) is audited and the lower
the latters expected utility. Together with the optimal declaration strategy, this creates
the strategic complementarities between taxpayersdeclarations that constitute the dening
feature of a coordination game. Specically, the higher the declaration of taxpayer j, the
higher the incentives of taxpayer i to comply as well.
The associated problems of multiplicity of equilibria are, however, side-stepped because of
the taxpayersuncertainty about the realized agencys type, , and the heterogeneous beliefs
1Except in the case of income y, of course, because it is assumed that everyone in a category has exactly
the same level of income. Adding some income heterogeneity avoids this perfect observability issue but
does not provide any new insight or a¤ect the predictions, so for simplicity this avenue is not pursued.
2Formally, if 1 is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the taxpayer is audited and 0 if she
is not, then a zeal error (Z = 1) occurs when 1 (1  (1  d) y) = 1; a negligence one (N = 1) when
(1  1) (1  d) y = 1. Implicit in the latter formula is the assumption that it is always protable for the
agency to audit a known evader (i.e., in such cases the ne is greater than the cost of the audit). The
alternative possibility implies the uninteresting solution where nobody is audited, even known evaders.
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about ai they derive from their disparate private signals, E (ai j si). This fundamental
uncertainty, plus the strategic uncertaintygenerated by the coordination game, create
the conditions for modelling tax evasion as a global game. This leads, through a process
akin to the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies(IDSDS) method, to a unique
equilibrium: in each iteration, signals provide information about what other taxpayers will
not do, and in the end it ensures that only one strategy survives, namely, one where taxpayers
with low signals (and hence low beliefs about being discovered) evade, while those with
high signals comply. Furthermore, equilibria with full, partial and zero evasion can arise,
depending on the value of the parameters.
The key prediction of the GIG model is that an agency that implements this relative
auditing policy will do (weakly) better than if it implemented the standard cut-o¤one,
ceteris paribus. Testing this hypothesis is the main purpose of the present study, though
the experimental dataset is rich enough as to allow for the investigation of others that will
also be analysed, like the use of higher-order beliefs or the comparative statics generated by
changes in the parameters of the problem.
3 Experiment design
The experiment took place at the ELSE computer laboratory of the University College
London (United Kingdom).3 76 people took part in four treatments (labelled GC; GE; LC
and LE for reasons to be explained later in this section), each involving a 60-to-90-minute
long session.4 They were not allowed to communicate for the entirety of the session and
could not see other peoples screens.
Each session consisted of 6 sections, namely, instructions, short quiz, trial rounds, exper-
imental rounds, questionnaire and payment. The instructions were read aloud by the in-
structor and, in order to ensure their correct understanding, the participants were asked to
complete a short quiz(shown in appendix A; correct answers and the rationale for them
were provided by the instructor after a few minutes). For the same reasons, participants
then played two trial(practice) rounds whose outcomes did not a¤ect their earnings. Af-
ter each of these rst three stages the instructor answered subjectsquestions in private.
Twenty independent experimental rounds were then played, and after that, subjects com-
pleted a questionnaire with information regarding personal data and the decision-making
3The pool of participants was recruited by ELSE from their database of about 1,000 people (most of
them UCL students). Two hundred of them were chosen randomly and invited to take part and the rst
100 who accepted the o¤er were allocated to sessions according to their time preferences. Five reserve
people were invited to each session and 7 of them had to be turned down because the target number (20
per session) was reached or because the treatment required an even number of participants (treatments GC
and GE). Each one of them was paid the £ 5 show-up fee before being dismissed. No person was allowed to
participate in more than one session.
4Participants were lined up outside the lab according to their arrival time. At the designated time they
entered and freely chose where to sit.
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process they followed. Finally, each participant was paid an amount of money consisting of a
xed show-up fee (£ 5) and a variable component equal to the earnings accumulated over the
20 experimental rounds.5 Table 1 shows the exchange rate used to translate experimental
currency into money, as well as other payment-related summary statistics.6
Treatment Participants £ per 1000 points Min/Avg/Max Payment
GC 18 0.50 10.80 11.52 11.80
GE 18 0.90 7.40 9.30 9.80
LC 20 0.50 11.60 11.65 11.80
LE 20 0.90 9.80 11.20 11.60
All 76 7.40 10.95 11.80
Note: £ per 1000 points is the exchange rate at which 1000 experimental pointswhere
transformed into pounds.
Table 1: Treatments. Participants and Money.
Each experimental round consisted of two stages: the Choiceone, where participants had
to make a decision that would a¤ect their payo¤s, and the Feedbackone, where they got
information about the round outcome.
Column player
Y Z
Row player Y x (Y; Y; q) x (Y;Z; q)
Z x (Z; Y; q) x (Z;Z; q)
Note: Only Row players payo¤s (x) are shown. Payo¤s components
are Row players action, Column players action and the realisation
of the random variable q. Column players payo¤s are symmetrical.
Table 2: Stage game.
In the choice stage a one-shot game was played where the subjects had to choose one
of two possible actions (Y or Z) interpreted as Evasion and Compliance, respectively (the
games normal form for the 2-person case is shown in table 2). In the experiment we focus
on the case in which all taxpayers/players have high income (y = 1). The reasons for this
are that introducing the possibility of low income periods will not add to our knowledge
(trivially, if y = 0 everyone declares truthfully) and that all interesting hypotheses to test are
related to the high-income scenario (not to mention the extra cost and time that running this
expanded experiment will demand). Thus, in the experiment choosing Y (Z) corresponds
to declaring low (high) income: di = 0 (di = 1) in the terminology of section 2.
A participant is payo¤ is a function of her own decision, di 2 D := fY;Zg, the decisions of
5 In other experimental studies (Heinemann et al. (2009) among them) participants were paid according
to the result of one randomly-chosen round. The rationale for this is that it avoids hedging, something that
is not a problem here: the maximum payment a person can receive in any given round is £ 0.50 or £ 0.90
(depending on the treatment), with expected values in the £ 0.30-£ 0.35 range.
6 In order to minimize delays and computational hassle, every persons payment was rounded up to the
closest multiple of £ 0.20. Participants were not told about this arrangement until after they completed
their questionnaires in order to avoid strategic play with respect to this peripheral matter.
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the other n   1 people in her category, d i := (d1; :::; di 1; di+1; :::; dn), d i 2 Dn 1, and
the realisation of a random variable, q 2 Q := fA;B;Cg. Formally,
xi := x (di;d i; q) (1)
Di¤erent choices have di¤erent e¤ects on payo¤s, and so, while the payo¤ of choosing Y
(evasion) can vary, that of option Z (compliance) is a known, xed quantity. Formally, for
every d i;d0 i 2 Dn 1; q; q0 2 Q,
x (Z) := x (Z;d i; q) = x
 
Z;d0 i; q
0 (2)
The random variable q can take values A, B and C with probabilities Pr(A) = 0:20, Pr(B) =
0:60 and Pr(C) = 0:20, respectively. It represents the di¤erent possible typesof agency
regarding evasion (A : soft, B : medium, C : tough) and corresponds to the mentioned
in section 2. It a¤ects evasion payo¤s negatively: the tougher the agency, the more likely the
evader will be audited and the lower her expected payo¤.7 Formally, for every d i 2 Dn 1;
x (Y;d i; A) > x (Y;d i; B) > x (Y;d i; C) (3)
At the time of making a decision participants do not know the value of q; but each one of
them gets a private signal si 2 S := fa; b; cg (called hintin the experiment) that is related
to the realized value of q as shown in table 3 (and in the Instructions sample in appendix
A). The instructions highlighted the fact that di¤erent people could get di¤erent hints but
q was the same for everyone. No other probabilities were provided explicitly, though the
instructions did supply the information required for their computation, namely, the prior
probability distribution of q; Pr(q); and the conditional one, Pr (qjsi).8
If hint =... ...then q =... ...with probability Pr (qjsi) =...
a A 1:000
b
A
B
C
0:125
0:750
0:125
c C 1:000
Table 3: Hints and q.
7 In the theoretical model x(Y;d i; q) corresponds to the expected payo¤ taxpayer i gets if she evades:
with some probability she is caught and pays a ne (low payo¤) and with the remaining probability she gets
away with her evasion (high payo¤).
In the experiment, however, audits are not undertaken and therefore payo¤s are xed. This is so because
the experimental setup is already quite demanding for subjects as to increase the level of complexity by
introducing uncertainty and, furthermore, doing so is not expected to provide any signicant insight beyond
the ones obtained with this simpler, neater setup.
Of course, subjects do face uncertainty regarding the choices made by other players (d i) and the type
of agency they face (q), as suggested by the theoretical model.
8A Choice stagescreenshot (labelled Choice screenin the experiment) can be seen in the instructions
sample in appendix A. The programme used was z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
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The participants submission of her decision (Y or Z) ended the Choice stage and gave
way to the Feedbackone, in which the person was informed about the realized value of q,
the signal she received, her choice and her payo¤ for the round.9 At no stage was a subject
given any information about the signals or choices of any other participant, since usually
taxpayers have little information about what other taxpayers know or how much income
they declare.
By clicking on the Continuebutton, participants exited the Feedbackstage and moved
on to the next round (if any was left). Rounds were identical to each other in terms of
their structure (Choice and Feedback stages) and rules (payo¤ computations, prior and
conditional probability distribution of q), but may have di¤ered in the realized values of the
random variables (q and s). Participants were told explicitly about this and informed that
each round was independent from every other one.
3.1 Treatments
The experiments treatments were dened according to the policy used (relative v cut-o¤, or
global(G) v lottery(L)) and the predicted optimal strategy of the participants (which
for this experiment, as will be shown later, reduces to determining the optimal choice when
hint b is received: to evade E (corresponding to choosing Y ) or to comply C (corresponding
to choosing X).10 This way the experimental setup can be visualized as in table 4.
Participants optimal
strategy if hint = b
Comply (C) Evade (E)
Auditing Relative (G) GC GE
rule Cut-o¤ (L) LC LE
Table 4: Treatments.
The di¤erence between Global and Lottery treatments is related to the e¤ect of other sub-
jectschoices on the payo¤s of individual participants. In the Lottery treatments the rule
implemented by the agency is of the cut-o¤ type, and so what other people do does not
9A Feedback stagescreenshot (labelled Results screenin the experiment) can be seen in the instruc-
tions sample in appendix A.
10Tax evasion has often been compared to a gamble in which the taxpayer wins (i.e., gets away with
evasion) with probability w; and loses (i.e., is caught and has to pay a ne on top of the unpaid taxes)
with probability 1   w. The cut-o¤ rule is equivalent to a standard lottery (and hence the name of the
treatment) because it xes the chances of winning (say w = 1   p) and losing (1   w = p). Evasion can
therefore be seen as equivalent to buying (1  p)N out of a total pool of N ra­ e tickets, each one of them
equally likely to be the winner.
In the Global treatments, on the other hand, those probabilities are not xed, because they are a¤ected
by what other people do. In particular, since other peoples compliance has a negative impact on my payo¤,
the fact that other people comply is equivalent to having the total number of tickets increased to, say,
N 0 > N; so that my probability of winning w0 (in spite of my holding the same number of tickets as before,
(1  p)N) is now comparatively lower: w0 = (1 p)N
N0 <
(1 p)N
N
= w:
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a¤ect player is payo¤. Formally, for every q 2 Q,11
x(Y; Y; q)=x(Y;Z; q) if treatment 2 fLC;LEg (4)
In Global treatments, on the other hand, the auditing policy followed is the relative one,
implying that other peoples declarations do have an impact on player is payo¤ via the
probability of detection. Formally, for every q 2 Q,
x(Y; Y; q)>x(Y;Z; q) if treatment 2 fGC;GEg (5)
It is worth mentioning here that the Lottery treatment can be interpreted as a special (limit)
case of the Global one in which the e¤ect of other peoples decisions on a certain participants
payo¤ is arbitrarily small. Consequently, and without loss of generality, henceforth the
analysis will be restricted to the Global case, with the occasional reference to the Lottery
one provided only when relevant.
For the experiment, participants in the Global treatments were divided in 9 groups of
2 people each, the matching protocol being random (equi-probable) within rounds and
independent across them.12 The experimental setup reproduced the three typical scenarios
described by the global game literature:
y The two extreme cases in which the fundamentalsare so bad/so goodthat there
exists a strictly dominant strategy. In the experiment the fundamental is the agencys
toughness, q, and so strict dominance requires that everyone should evade when the
agency is very soft (q = A) and that everyone should comply when it is very tough
(q = C). Formally, for every d0 2 D;
x (Y; d0; A) > x (Z) (6)
x (Y; d0; C) < x (Z) (7)
y The intermediate one in which the fundamentalsare neither so badnor so good.
In this case a coordination game is created and, consequently, no strategy dominates
all others: which one is optimal depends on what other people do. In the experiment,
this corresponds to the scenario in which the agencys type is medium(q = B): if
the other person in my group evades, it is optimal for me to evade as well; if the other
person complies, I am better o¤ complying too.13 Formally,
x (Y; Y;B) > x (Z) > x (Y; Z;B) (8)
11 I restrict my attention to the 2-person case, which will be the relevant one throughout the paper. The
extension to the n-person case is straightforward.
12For the rest of the paper, the variables corresponding to the two members of a group will be denoted
by lowercase letters (e.g., signal s, decision d, etc.) and by primed lowercase letters (e.g., signal s0, decision
d0, etc.), respectively.
13Clearly, this does not apply to the Lottery case.
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Turning now to the other dimension that denes treatments, the di¤erence between the Eva-
sion and Compliance ones is due to their di¤erent predictions regarding what a participants
optimal strategy should be if signal b is observed. Thus, distinguishing E from C treatments
demands the solving of the taxpayer problem, namely, choosing between Evasion (Y ) and
Compliance (Z) using all the information available (s) in order to maximize expected util-
ity. In this setup, therefore, a taxpayers strategy  is a vector of decisions, one for each
possible signal s 2 S. Formally,  := ( (a) ;  (b) ;  (c)), where  : S ! D is a function
that maps signals into decisions.14 Therefore, nding the solution requires comparing the
(certain) utility of compliance, u(Z), and the expected utility of evasion:
Eu (Y;k0 (s0) js) := P
q2Q
Pr (qjs) P
s02S
Pr (s0jq) fk0 (s0)u (Y; Y; q) + [1  k0 (s0)]u (Y; Z; q)g
(9)
where u (Y; d0; q) := u (x (Y; d0; q)) is the utility I derive from receiving payo¤ x (Y; d0; q) ;
s0 2 S and d0 2 D are respectively the signal and decision of the other member of my group;
Pr (s0jq) 2 [0; 1] is the conditional probability of the other member getting signal s0 given
that the agencys type is q; and k0(s0) := (k0(a); k0(b); k0(c)), such that k0(s0) and 1  k0(s0)
are my beliefs regarding what the other member of my group would do if she received signal
s0: if I expect her to choose Y then k0(s0) = 1 (and 1  k0(s0) = 0), if I expect her to choose
Z then k0(s0) = 0 (and 1  k0(s0) = 1).
This comparison depends crucially on the beliefs a player holds about the actions to be
followed by the other member of her group, k0(s0), and, thus, on the ability and sophistication
of the subjects at forming them, a matter that is directly related to the concepts of common
knowledge and higher-order beliefs (HOBs, Carlsson and van Damme (1993)). HOBs refer
to the levels of reasoning involved in reaching a conclusion and are neatly connected to the
(game theoretical) method of Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS):
with each iteration, the order of beliefs increases one level. Furthermore, HOBs are the key
factor behind the uniqueness of the global game equilibrium: in the rst iteration, t = 1,
my private signal gives me information about the set of strategies (out of the original set,
0) that are strictly dominated by others and will therefore never be played. In the second
iteration, t = 2, the set of those strategies that survived the previous round of deletions is
the new feasible set, 1. Via an analogous mechanism, a new group of strictly dominated
strategies will be discarded and after that a new iteration t = 3 with feasible set 2 will
begin. The theory of global games proves that in the limit, after an arbitrarily large number
of iterations, the feasible set 1 has only one element, . In other words, the equilibrium
is unique.
In the experiment, only 2 iterations are needed to nd the unique solution to the taxpayer
problem.15 Thus we can classify players based on the number of iterations used (1 or 2):
14Actually, it maps signals into probability distributions over decisions, if one allows for mixed strategies.
However, this possibility was explicitly ruled out here because its inclusion would not have provided any
extra, signicant insight as to justify the complexity-associated problems it would have entailed.
15This does not apply to Lottery treatments for the obvious reason that in those cases, by denition, a
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Denition 1 A player who uses only 1 iteration is dened as Rudimentary.
Denition 2 A player who uses 2 iterations is dened as Sophisticated.
In other words, both types of players understand the game-theoretical concept of domi-
nant/dominated strategy, but di¤er in the scope of their understanding: while Rudimentary
players only recognize what is evident, Sophisticated ones go one step further and build up
on what Rudimentary players do. The following two propositions state how they rank the
available strategies.16
Proposition 1 (Rudimentary Dominance (RD)) According to Rudimentary players:
1. if s = a (signal is low), Evasion strictly dominates Compliance;
2. if s = b (signal is medium), no strategy strictly dominates the other; and
3. if s = c (signal is high), Compliance strictly dominates Evasion.
Proposition 2 (Sophisticated Dominance (SD)) According to Sophisticated players:
1. if s = a (signal is low), Evasion strictly dominates Compliance;
2. if s = b (signal is medium), then:
(a) in E treatments, Evasion strictly dominates Compliance; and
(b) in C treatments, Compliance strictly dominates Evasion; and
3. if s = c (signal is high), Compliance strictly dominates Evasion.
The rationale for taking into account both scenarios when s = b in proposition 2 reects,
above all, the lack of theoretical predictions or stylized facts about what strategy we should
expect to be played in that case.
The optimal strategy of a player is therefore:
Hypothesis 1 (Optimal Strategy (OS)) According to the global game technique, the op-
timal strategy of a player is as follows:
1. If signal is soft (s = a) then evade (d = Y );
2. if signal is medium (s = b) then:
taxpayers payo¤ does not depend on other peoples choices or the taxpayers beliefs about them.
16The derivation of these two results is shown in appendix B.
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(a) in E treatments, evade (d = Y ); and
(b) in C treatments, comply (d = Z); and
3. if signal is tough (s = c) then comply (d = Z).
If choices satisfy all three parts of the hypothesis, then one can say they are consistent
with the SD predictionsand label the player as Sophisticated. If they only satisfy the
parts 1 and 3, they are consistent with the RD predictionsand the player can be labelled
as Rudimentary.
3.2 Selection of payo¤s
The key hypothesis to test is the following one:
Hypothesis 2 (Superiority of Relative Auditing Strategy (SRAS)) For a given level
of enforcement, Global treatments generate less (expected) targeting errors than Lottery ones
for all possible types of agency, q 2 Q.
The payo¤s of the four treatments (shown on table 5) were chosen to make the satisfaction
of hypothesis 2 as di¢ cult as possible. This way, if the data supports the global game
predictions in these most demanding conditions, then the theory could be expected to be
an even better predictor in more favorable environments.
Person 1s choice Person 2s choice Type of agency GC GE LC LE
Y Y A 1,000 1,000 715 1,000
Y Y B 655 145 655 145
Y Y C 579 6 579 1
Y Z A 658 156 715 1,000
Y Z B 651 135 655 145
Y Z C 0 0 579 1
Z {Y,Z} {A,B,C} 654 140 654 140
Note: Only payo¤s of Person 1 are shown. Those of Person 2 are symmetric.
Table 5: Payo¤s. All treatments.
It is worth noting at this point that the global game technique selects one of the equilibria
of a coordination game, an equilibrium that coincides (for 2  2 games like the ones used
here) with the one selected by the risk dominancecriterion (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)).
Intuitively, the latter chooses the equilibrium which, if abandoned, inicts the highest costs
on the players. In the experiment, the risk-dominant equilibrium depends on the treatment:
it is (Y; Y ) in the GE treatment and (Z;Z) in the GC one. These are, not surprisingly, the
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choices that proposition 1 predicted to be optimal in those treatments, thus conrming that
both the global games theory and the risk-dominance criterion select the same equilibrium.
There is, however, an important competitor for the risk-dominance/global game criterion:
the payo¤-dominance criterion. It simply states that if all equilibria can be Pareto-ranked,
players will coordinate on the dominant one. In the experiment, the payo¤-dominant equi-
librium is always (Y; Y ), regardless of the treatment.
Thus, the payo¤-dominance and risk-dominance criteria select the same equilibrium in the
GE treatment but di¤erent ones in the GC one. The fact that the criteria reinforce each
other in GE but compete against each other in GC suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Relative Frequency (RF)) The frequency of choices that are consistent
with the global game/risk-dominance predictions is (weakly) higher in GE than in GC.
Finally, it is important to mention here that risk aversion could dramatically alter the
predictions of the model, and this may be especially important since evidence indicates that
attempts to induce risk-preferences seem not to work (Selten et al. (1999)). The solution
implemented in the experiment was to choose parameters such that all constraints will be
satised for a large range of risk preferences. In particular, in E-treatments parameters
are robust for degrees of relative risk aversion as high as 0:4 (about 60% of the population,
according to Holt and Laury (2002)). In C-treatments, they are robust for values as low
as 0 (about 80% of the population, according to the same study). Also, it is acknowledged
in the experimental literature that when playing complex games people often avoids the
complications of utility maximisation and instead simply maximize payo¤s, which implies
that risk preferences should not be an important issue here.
4 Results
A total of 1,520 observations were collected in the experiment, and table 6 shows the break-
down by treatment. It also shows summary statistics of the key variables needed for testing
the hypotheses of the previous section:
Sophisticated Dominance measures the coincidence between the data and the global
game theoretical predictions about the subjectschoices (SD=1 if data ts predictions
and 0 otherwise). Its name reects the fact that those predictions are based on the
concept of sophisticated dominance (proposition 2).
Errors quanties the number of tageting errors (per observation/datapoint) made by the
agency (ERR=1 if an error was made, 0 otherwise).
13
Note that Sophisticated Dominance is never lower than 50% and Errors never above 35%.
Treatment Observations
Sophisticated
Dominance (SD)
Errors (ERR)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
GC 360 0.7722 0.4200 0.1522 0.2252
GE 360 0.8639 0.3434 0.2028 0.3034
LC 400 0.5450 0.4986 0.3473 0.3303
LE 400 0.9300 0.2555 0.3243 0.3726
All 1,520 0.7757 0.4173 0.2608 0.3248
Note: SD=1 if subjects choice coincides with global games prediction, 0 otherwise.
ERR=1 if agency made an error, 0 otherwise.
Table 6: Summary Statistics. Dominance and Errors.
For hypothesis testing, it would be useful to aggregate data in two di¤erent ways, depending
on the information available to the relevant actor. Thus, for hypotheses related to the
decisions of the taxpayers (OS and RF), data are aggregated by signal (columns 3-5 in table
7). For those related to actions of the agency (SRAS), on the other hand, the aggregation
is done according to the type of agency (columns 6-8 in the same table).
Treatment Observations Signal (s) Agencys type (q)
a b c A B C
GC 360 7 295 58 18 234 108
GE 360 29 292 39 54 234 72
LC 400 29 330 41 60 260 80
LE 400 51 337 12 100 280 20
All 1,520 116 1,254 150 232 1,008 280
Note: Interpretation of s=q: a=A: soft; b=B: medium; c=C : tough.
Table 7: Number of observations, aggregated by signal and type of agency.
For the analysis, data from all subjects for all periods were pooled. This is justied because
there is little variability in behavior after the rst few rounds of each treatment:17 many
people choose exactly the same option every time they receive a given signal. This lack of
variability over time is not a bad thing in itself (the theory actually predicts such rigidity),
but it precludes the possibility of using other econometric techniques (e.g., panel data).
4.1 Optimal Strategy and Relative Frequency hypotheses
The set of variables that is going to be used for testing is described in table 8.
17Except in the GE one, that requires 10 rounds to become stable. This, however, does not usually have
an impact on results, and when it does, it will be mentioned in the text.
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Variable Role Type Description
SD Dependent Dummy 1 if choice coincides with prediction, 0 otherwise
Ds Dependent Dummy Idem SD, but for s 2 S given
RD Dependent Dummy Idem SD, but for s 2 fa; cg
AD Dependent Dummy Idem SD, but for s = b
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE treatment, 0 otherwise
a Explanatory Dummy 1 if s = a, 0 otherwise
b Explanatory Dummy 1 if s = b, 0 otherwise
c Explanatory Dummy 1 if s = c, 0 otherwise
Note: Predictions as dened in hypothesis 1.
Table 8: Variables of the model. Dominance.
Dep. Var.! Da Db Dc RD AD SD
a 1.0205 0.7091
[0] [0]
b 0.5030
[0]
c 0.9855 0.7671
[0] [0]
g 0.0000 0.2803 -0.0345 -0.0201 0.2803 0.2227
[0.082] [0] [0.158] [0.35] [0] [0]
e -0.0196 0.4714 0.0000 -0.0297 0.4714 0.3928
[0.323] [0] [0.706] [0.072] [0] [0]
ge 0.0196 -0.3543 -0.0681 -0.0095 -0.3543 -0.2998
[0.323] [0] [0.217] [0.804] [0] [0]
cons 1.0000 0.4485 1.0000 0.4485
[.] [0] [0] [0]
Obs 116 1,254 150 266 1,254 1,520
LC 1.0000 0.4485 1.0000 1.0000 0.4485 .5450
LE 0.9804 0.9199 1.0000 0.9841 0.9199 .9300
GC 1.0000 0.7288 0.9655 0.9692 0.7288 .7722
GE 1.0000 0.8459 0.8974 0.9412 0.8459 .8639
Note: Top panel: Probability that estimate =0 is shown in brackets below estimate.
Bottom panel displays observed average values of the dependent variable.
Table 9: Estimation. Dominance. Overall and by signal.
Ds measures Dominance when only observations with a given signal s are considered. RD
means Rudimentary Dominance and considers only observations when signals are soft (a) or
tough (c). AD measures Advanced Dominanceand only takes into account observations
with medium signals (hence, it is identical to Db).18 The unit of observation is the individual
18Thus, loosely speaking, we can say that Sophisticated Dominance is the sum of Rudimentary and
Advanced Dominance: Rudimentary people do only one iteration (see appendix B) and, consequently,
follow the optimal strategy (hypothesis 1) only when they receive soft or tough signals (parts 1 and 3 of the
hypothesis). In turn, Sophisticated people do two iterations meaning that, on top of following parts 1 and
3, the also follow part 2 of the hypothesis (when the signal is medium). This second, incremental iteration
is thus directly connected to the concept of Advanced Dominance as dened in the text.
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player and the model used is
SD = 1g + 2e+ 3ge+ 1a+ 2b+ 3c+ " (10)
(analogous ones are used for the other dependent variables considered). The estimates are
shown in table 9.
Dep. Var.! Da Db Dc RD AD SD
LC X X X
LE X X X
GC X X X
GE X X X X X
LC=GC GC GC GC
LE=GE GE LE LE LE LE
LC=LE LC LE LE LE
GC=GE GE GE GE
Note: Top panel: Empty if data ts prediction in hypothesis OS; Xotherwise. Bottom panel:
Empty if no statistically-signicant di¤erence, treatment with higher dominance otherwise.
Table 10: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
Table 10 shows the results of the tests in a schematic way.19 The rst panel tests the OS
hypothesis (see note below the table for interpretation of symbols). The null hypothesis is
that data are consistent with the predictions of the Global Games technique (hypothesis
1),20 a hypothesis that is supported in the cases of soft and tough signals (s = a and s = c)
and that implies that people are, at least, Rudimentary.21 When the signal is medium,
however, the Global Game predictions are rejected for all treatments and, therefore, the
OS hypothesis is quantitatively rejected as well (i.e., those aspects related to part 2 of
the hypothesis). Qualitatively, however, the results do support the predictions, as can be
seen in gures 1 and 2, where the observed strategies resemble the shape of the predicted
ones (except for LC).22 Having in mind the discreteness of the model (which amplies
divergences) and that the parameters were chosen to make the test as di¢ cult to pass as
possible for the Global Games theory, the result is still encouraging.
Result 1 (Qualitative Sophistication (QS)) People are, at least, Rudimentary: they
act as predicted by the OS hypothesis when signals are soft or tough. The hypothesis that
they make decisions in a way consistent with the second part of the OS hypothesis is rejected
in quantitative terms (and so is the OS hypothesis, consequently) but supported in qualitative
terms.
The bottom panel of table 10 compares the levels of Dominance of the di¤erent treatments.
19The tests are shown in table 17 in appendix E.
20The predicted value is 1 for all cases, which means that all observations should match predictions.
21The null hypothesis is rejected in the GE case because of an outlier. If discarded, the hypothesis cannot
be rejected.
22 In the gures, 1 corresponds to Evasion (choice Y ) and 0 to Compliance (choice Z).
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Figure 1: Observed and Predicted choices. E-treatments.
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Figure 2: Observed and Predicted choices. C-treatments.
The null hypothesis for the rst two lines is that Dominance is the same in Global and
Lottery treatments, i.e., when the Relative Auditing Strategy (RAS) and the Cut-O¤ Rule
(COR) are used, respectively. The table shows that the hypothesis is supported for RD
but not for AD and SD. On the other hand, the theory cannot explain why AD and SD
are higher for Global in the C-treatments but higher for Lottery in the E-treatments. It is
worth noting, though, that the di¤erence between GE and LE vanishes when only the last
10 periods of both treatments are considered (see gure 4). So we get that:
Result 2 (G v L Dominance (GLD)) Global treatments foster more Advanced and So-
phisticated Dominance than Lottery ones. There is no di¤erence between the two treatments
in terms of Rudimentary Dominance.
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For the last two lines, the null hypothesis is that Dominance is the same in Evasion and
Compliance treatments. Once again, it is satised for RD but not for AD and SD. But
now AD and SE are higher in E treatments than in C ones, regardless of the auditing rule
used (RAS or COR). This can be explained for the GC v GE case, last line of the panel
by the coincidence of the risk- and payo¤-dominant equilibria in the GE treatment and the
discrepancy between them in the GC one.23 This is thus consistent with the RF hypothesis:
Result 3 (C v E Dominance (CED)) Evasion treatments foster more Advanced and So-
phisticated Dominance than Compliance ones. There is no di¤erence between the two treat-
ments in terms of Rudimentary Dominance. Thus, the RF hypothesis cannot be rejected.
These results can also be visualized in gures 3 and 4. The rst one conrms that RD
is strongly supported by data and that di¤erent treatments do not a¤ect it. The second
one focuses on choices when the signal is medium and attests that AD and SD predictions
are quantitatively rejected, though they are qualitatively supported in all treatments but
LC. It also shows that treatments can be ranked as determined by the tests, namely, (from
higher to lower Sophisticated Dominance), LE; GE; GC and LC.24
Rudimentary Dominance. All treatments. Period averages.
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Figure 3: Rudimentary Dominance. All treatments. Period averages
4.2 Superiority of Relative Auditing Strategy hypothesis
The key prediction of theGIGmodel is that a tax agency would be advised to use the relative
auditing strategy (RAS) and to discard the cut-o¤ rule (COR). Following Sanchez Villalba
(2015), this means that for given enforcement coststhe agency would make less targeting
23The theory is unable to explain the di¤erence between E and C in the Lottery treatments.
24Restricting attention to the last 10 periods so that the learning process in GE converges, the di¤erence
between GE and LE.
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Advanced Dominance. All treatments. Period averages
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Figure 4: Advanced Dominance. All treatments. Period averages.
errors if implementing the RAS than if using the COR. These targeting errors are the Zeal
and Negligence ones dened in section 2 (see especially footnote 2), though for the reasons
explained on page 6the analysis will focus on the Negligence errors only.
The unit of observation is the 2-person group of players in the G-treatments and it is the
individual player in the L-treatments. Thus, in order to be able to compare them, the
G-treatment errors were normalised and expressed in per capita terms. The model to be
estimated is thus:
ERR = 1g + 2e+ 3ge+ 1A+ 2B + 3C + " (11)
where the variables are dened as in table 11.
Variable Role Type Description
ERR Dependent Ordinal

In LC, LE: 1 if an error was made, 0 otherwise
In GC, GE: 1 if 2 errors, 12 if 1 error, 0 otherwise
ERRq Dependent Ordinal Idem ERR, but for q 2 Q given
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE treatment, 0 otherwise
A Explanatory Dummy 1 if q = A, 0 otherwise
B Explanatory Dummy 1 if q = B, 0 otherwise
C Explanatory Dummy 1 if q = C, 0 otherwise
Note: ERR measures negligence errors per capita in a 2-person group in treatments GC, GE and individual negligence
erros in treatments LC, LE.
Table 11: Variables of the model. Errors.
The estimates can be seen in table 12.
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Dep. Var.! ERRA ERRB ERRC ERR
A 0.8610
[0]
B 0.2886
[0]
C 0.1526
[0]
g 0.0059 -0.1610 -0.1847 -0.1242
[0.956] [0] [0] [0]
e 0.3718 -0.2130 -0.1950 -0.1007
[0] [0] [0] [0]
ge -0.0967 0.1466 0.1856 0.0804
[0.423] [0] [0] [0]
cons 0.5482 0.3477 0.1954
[0] [0] [0]
Obs 232 1,008 280 1,520
LC 0.5482 0.3477 0.1954 0.3473
LE 0.9200 0.1346 0.0004 0.3243
GC 0.5541 0.1866 0.0107 0.1522
GE 0.8293 0.1203 0.0013 0.2028
Note: Top panel: Probability that estimate =0 is shown in brackets
below estimate. Bottom panel displays observed average values of
the dependent variable.
Table 12: Estimation. Errors. Overall and by type of agency.
In a fashion similar to the one used in section 4.1, several tests are shown in a schematic
form in table 13 (the values of the tests can be found in table 18 in appendix E).
Dep. Var.: ERRA ERRB ERRC ERR
LC + + + +
LE - -
GC + + +
GE - - -
LC=GC GC GC GC
LE=GE GE LE GE
LC=LE LC LE LE LE
GC=GE GC GE
Note: Top panel: Empty if data ts predictions; +if observed errors
are higher than predicted; - otherwise. Bottom panel: Empty if no
statistically-signicant di¤erence, treatment with less errors otherwise.
Table 13: Errors tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
The top panel tests the accuracy of predictions and shows that the data do not t them. In
particular, errors are usually higher than predicted in C treatments but lower than predicted
in E ones. This is consistent with the Dominance results, which indicate that too many
people evade when they should comply (C treatments) and comply when they should evade
(E treatments). The main conclusion, thus, is basically the same as the one found for
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Figure 5: Errors. Soft agency. GC v LC.
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Figure 6: Errors. Medium agency. GC v LC.
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Figure 7: Errors. Tough agency. GC v LC.
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Figure 8: Errors. Soft agency. GE v LE.
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Figure 9: Errors. Medium agency. GE v LE.
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Figure 10: Errors. Tough agency. GE v LE.
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Dominance in Result 1, and subject to the same qualications.
The rst two lines of the bottom panel are the important ones: they show the tests for the
SRAS hypothesis. Given the minimum variability in the extreme cases (when the agency
is too soft, q = A, or too tough, q = C), the relevant tests are those for the medium one,
and this one shows clearly that the Global treatments lead to less errors per capita than the
Lottery ones. In other words, the SRAS hypothesis is strongly supported.
Result 4 (Superiority of the Relative Auditing Strategy (SRAS)) From the agencys
perspective, the Relative Auditing Strategy (RAS) is better than the Cut-O¤ Rule (COR).
The last two lines test whether there are signicant di¤erences between E and C treatments
and show (again focusing on the medium case) that the rst lead to less errors than the
second. Again, this can be linked to the Dominance analysis, where E treatments show a
higher degree of coincidence with predictions than C ones. This means, in other words, than
in the latter many people evaded when they should have complied, and the higher number
of associated errors thus explains the present result.
Finally, it is important to notice that all these ndings are also supported graphically, as
shown in gures 5 to 10. It can be clearly seen there that G treatments (i.e., those in
which the Relative Auditing Strategy is implemented) lead to (weakly) less errors than L
ones (those in which the Cut-O¤ Rule is used). The gures also show that errors are a
decreasing function of the agencys toughness, which is consistent with the comparative
statics predicted by the Global Games theory.
Result 5 (E¤ect of agencys type (EAT)) Errors decrease with the agencys tough-
ness.
4.3 Characteristics and Decisions
The analysis can be deepened by using the information collected in the questionnnaire run
after the experimental rounds. The relevant variables are shown in table 14.
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Variable Role Type Description
AD Dependent Dummy 1 if data ts proposition SD (part 2), 0 otherwise
g Explanatory Dummy 1 if G treatment, 0 otherwise
e Explanatory Dummy 1 if E treatment, 0 otherwise
ge Explanatory Dummy Interaction term: 1 if GE treatment, 0 otherwise
gender Explanatory Dummy 1 if female, 0 otherwise
age Explanatory Natural
study Explanatory Ordinal 0 : no study, 1 : non-economics, 2 : economics
# exp Explanatory Ordinal 0 : none, 1 : 1 to 4, 2 : 5+ experiments
math Explanatory Ordinal 0 : none, 1 : basic, 2 : advanced knowledge
prob Explanatory Ordinal 0 : none, 1 : basic, 2 : advanced knowledge
game Explanatory Ordinal 0 : none, 1 : basic, 2 : advanced knowledge
Note: Studyrefers to area of study. Math/Prob/Gamerefer to knowledge of
mathematics, probability theory and game theory, respectively.
Table 14: Questionnaire variables. Dominance.
The analysis will be restricted to that of AD. The reasons for this are two: rst, the previous
section proved that RD is satised almost perfectly for the whole sample of participants,
regardless of their individual characteristics; and second, AD is the main source of SD
variability, since in most observations the signal is medium (see table 7).
The question we want to address is: what (if any) are the personal characteristics that drive
players choices?25 In order to answer it, the variables dened in table 14 were used to
estimate the following model (the unit of observation is the individual player):
AD = + 1g + 2e+ 3ge+
+ 1gender + 2age+ 3#exp+4math+ 5prob+ 6game+ " (12)
The results (shown in table 15) indicate that estimates are robust to the specication of
the model (last three columns)26 and that most of the times there is not much di¤erence
between treatments or between individual treatments and the whole sample. The analysis
nds that being male, young, not-knowledgeable at maths and not-knowledgeable at game
theory makes a subject more likely to make decisions that coincide with the predictions of
the Global Games theory. There is no rationale for the gender e¤ect (which, apart from the
whole sample, is signicant only in the LE treatment), though it is important to note that a
similar result is found by Heinemann et al. (2009). The age e¤ect may seem to reect that
most subjects are university students, but actually it is driven by a few older outliers: if
the analysis restricts its attention to up-to-25-year-olds(1,050 observations), age becomes
non-signicant. A similar story can be told about mathematics: it becomes insignicant
25To complement this enquiry, subjects were classied into categories according to the strategies that
they followed in the experiment. The analysis is presented in appendix C of the appendix. The Chance
Maximizers category is particularly important, as it is postulated as the main factor that could explain
why treatment LC yields results signicantly di¤erent from the ones predicted by the Global Games theory
(together with the risk-dominance/payo¤-dominance equilibrium).
26For this very reason, only OLS estimates are shown throughout the whole paper.
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when the youngsample is used (thus eliminating the puzzling result that the estimates
sign was negative). Area of study is not signicant and, surprisingly, neither are knowledge
of probability theory or participation in other experiments (though Heinemann et al. (2004)
nd the same result regarding experience27).
OLS Probit Logit
GC GE LC LE All All All
g 0.2914 0.8573 1.3932
[0] [0] [0]
e 0.4895 1.7349 3.0951
[0] [0] [0]
ge -0.3894 -1.4149 2.4897
[0] [0] [0]
gender -0.0306 0.0078 0.0967 -0.0738 -0.0616 -0.2761 0.4752
[0.745] [0.853] [0.31] [0.005] [0.011] [0.003] [0.004]
age -0.0385 -0.0282 -0.0251 0.0039 -0.0078 -0.0304 0.0540
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
study 0.1916 0.0349 -0.5397 -0.0149 -0.0306 -0.1446 0.2348
[0.004] [0.514] [0] [0.787] [0.369] [0.312] [0.382]
#exp 0.0006 0.1402 -0.0677 -0.0160 -0.0059 -0.0416 0.0729
[0.988] [0] [0.161] [0.575] [0.738] [0.513] [0.507]
maths -0.5119 0.0418 0.1660 -0.0788 -0.0993 -0.3749 0.6982
[0] [0.432] [0.196] [0.099] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
prob -0.0454 -0.0060 0.0033 0.1204 0.0047 0.0219 0.0314
[0.635] [0.893] [0.963] [0.007] [0.866] [0.834] [0.867]
game 0.3409 0.1840 0.0362 0.0242 0.0961 0.4249 0.6918
[0] [0] [0.464] [0.193] [0] [0] [0]
cons 2.0118 1.2868 1.3768 0.8555 0.7772 1.1536 2.1058
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
Obs 295 292 330 337 1,254 1,254 1,254
Note: Probability that estimate =0 is shown in brackets below estimate.
Table 15: Estimation. E¤ect of personal characteristics on choices.
The only robustly signicant variable seems to be knowledge of game theory, which has a
positive e¤ect on AD. Furthermore, it is signicant in both treatments in which strategic
(i.e., game theoretic) interactions took place. This may indicate that some degree of in-
doctrination may have played a role and so that training can breed sophistication. This
suggests that a typical population (in which knowledge of game theory is negligible for
most people) could make choices quite di¤erent from the ones suggested by the Global
Games theory. However, it is reasonable to assume that rms (the targeted population in
Sanchez Villalba (2015)) are sophisticated, as they are used to take strategic interactions
into account when making nancial, marketing, logistic, ... and tax-related decisions. There-
fore, the theory would be a good predictor of behavior for rms. Moreover, a similar result
27Subjects were not asked what type of experiments they took part in, so previous experience may not
have been useful for solving the decision problem of this experiment. Medical or psichological experiments,
for example, usually do not provide much help in solving economic problems. I am grateful to Silvia Martínez
Gorricho for pointing this out.
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could be achieved if individual taxpayers had access to sophisticated professional advice,
something that is indeed likely to occur (especially for wealthy individuals).
5 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of tax evasion is problematic because of the reluctance of both tax-
payers and tax agencies to provide the relevant information. This study, therefore, uses
experimental data as a second-best alternative and focuses on the testing of some of the the-
oretical predictions obtained in Sanchez Villalba (2015), though the richness of the dataset
also allows for the investigation of other interesting hypotheses related to decision-making
processes and the global game theory, so that the results found can be extrapolated to other
similar games (Global Inspection Games), e.g., the allocation of welfare benets or the
awarding of bonuses based on peer-evaluations.
Results are strongly supportive of the main prediction of the GIG model, namely, that a tax
agency using a relative auditing strategy would do better than if it used the standard cut-o¤
one. The negative externality between taxpayers generated by the relative policy and the
associated strategic uncertainty it creates seem to be the powerful forces behind this result.
Also supported by the data are the predictions derived from the comparative statics of global
games: evasion is higher in E treatments than in C ones, evasion is a decreasing function
of signals, and errors decrease with agencys toughness.
The picture, so encouraging in qualitative terms, is however radically di¤erent when consid-
ering it quantitatively: in general, the numerical predictions of the theory are rejected by the
data. This is true for the medium cases (when the signal is medium), but not for the extreme
ones though: in the latter, data t the predictions and support the idea that people are,
at least, Rudimentary and (intuitively) understand the concept of dominance in simple
scenarios. Medium cases, on the other hand, show that most people do not use higher-order
beliefs when making their decisions (not even in this simple experiment, in which only two
iterations are needed). In spite of this, many times they do choose the actions predicted by
the theory of global games, usually after playing the game a few times. This learningresult
is not so surprising, as it was already hinted by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and found
experimentally by Cabrales et al. (2007). Other factors also seem to a¤ect decisions, like
the tension between the risk-dominant and payo¤-dominant equilibria, with their predicted
e¤ects closely mimicked by the data. More worrying, however, is the apparently pervasive
presence of a signicant group of people (chance maximizers) who choose their strategies
without taking into account all the available information (in this particular experiment, the
payo¤s in di¤erent scenarios) and that lead to the largest di¤erences between observed and
predicted actions (treatment LC). This concern is connected to the main result derived
from the analysis of questionnaire data, which suggests that those with knowledge of game
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theory are more likely to play according to predictions than those without that knowledge
. This result can have an impact on policy-making, as one would expect higher degree of
sophisticationamong rms than among individual taxpayers (though the latter group can
change their status if they have access to sophisticated professional advice).
The bottom line is, therefore, that though people may not use higher-order beliefs, many
times they end up choosing the same actions than the ones predicted by the Global Games
theory. Consequently, this ensures that predictions are usually supported in qualitative terms
(comparative statics and inter-treatment comparisons) but rejected in quantitative ones.
Nonetheless, the latter problem can be deemed as a minor one because of two mitigating
factors: First, the discreteness of the model can work against it because it amplies small
di¤erences and thus make the data-predictions matches more di¢ cult (something already
highlighted by Heinemann et al. (2002)). And second, the parameters of the model were
explicitly chosen to discourage said matches. Thus, the fact that the data does support
(qualitatively) the predictions in these most demanding conditions suggests that the theory
would be an even better predictor in more favorable environments.
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A Instructions for treatment GC28
Introduction
First of all, thank you very much for taking part in this experiment. It is
important to start by saying that, though part of a serious research programme,
this experiment is NOT a test. There are no rightor wronganswers.
How it works
Before we do anything, we have to run through a few ground rules and
instructions. After that we will move to the experiment proper, where you will
be asked to make decisions in a number of economic situations presented to you.
Finally you will get paid: on top of a show-up fee of £ 5, you will get a sum of
money that will depend on your performance in the situations mentioned before.
The experiment consists of 5 stages:
 Instructions
 Trial rounds
 Experiment rounds
 Questionnaire
 Payment
We will go through these in detail below.
Ground rules
For the experiment to work we need to run it according to fairly strict rules,
but there are not too many:
28 Instructions for the other treatments were similar to these ones, with the logical changes in rules and
parameters needed in each case.
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 From now until the end of the experiment, please do not talk (it will
not take long!)
 If there is something you need to ask about the way the experiment
works just raise your hand -the experimenter will come to your desk.
 Please do not use the computer until you are told to.
The Six Stages
1 Instructions
The experimenter will read out the instructions. If you have questions, this
is the time to deal with them. Just raise your hand and the experimenter will
answer them privately.
2 Short quiz
This is to ensure that you understand the instructions.
3 Trial rounds
The experiment is organised in a series of rounds. Each round is a period
in which you interact via the computer onlywith the other participants and
make decisions that determine the amount of money you will get at the end of
the session.
As a warm-up you will rst take part in 2 trial rounds. These trial rounds
are identical to the experiment rounds in every respect with one exception: the
e¤ect on payment. Trial rounds do NOT a¤ect your reward at the end of the
experiment. They allow you to check out the interface and familiarise yourself
with the screen tables, buttons and commands. They also allow you to make
mistakes without losing money.
4 Experiment rounds
This is the real thing. What you do during these rounds will determine the
total amount of money you will get.
The following Frequently Asked Questionswill lead you through the basic
mechanics of the rounds.
4.1. What is this all about?
Let us start by saying that the experiment will consist of 20 experiment
rounds. In each one of them the computer will pair you up with one other
participant. Each of the other participants in the room is equally likely to be
paired up with you.
4.2. What do I have to do?
You have to choose one of two possible actions, namely Y or Z. You choose
one or the other by clicking on your preferred option in the bottom left panel of
the choice screen (see gure 1) and then pressing the OKbutton in the same
panel.
Figure 1: Choice screen
29
4.3. How is my payo¤ for the round determined?
Your payo¤ for the round depends on your own action, the action of the other
participant, and an unknown parameter called q.
4.4. But exactly how is my payo¤ for the round determined?
There are two cases to consider:
a. If you choose action Z, your payo¤ is 654 experimental points with
certainty.
b. If you choose action Y, your payo¤ depends on both the value of q and
the action of the other participant, as shown in the table below (and also in the
top-left panel of the choice screen (see gure 1)):
Value of q
A B C
Other participants Y 1000 655 579
choice Z 658 651 0
That is, if you choose Z, you always get 654 experimental points, regardless
of what the other participant does and what the value of q is. But if you choose
Y, then there are several cases to consider. Let us see some of them (remembering
that in all of them you choose Y and your payo¤ is measured in experimental
points):
If the other participant chooses Y and q equals A, then your payo¤ is 1000.
If the other participant chooses Y and q equals B, then your payo¤ is 655.
And so on.
4.5. So how much money do I get then?
Your payo¤s are transformed into money at a rate of: 1000 experimental
points= 50 pence
That is, if your payo¤ for the round is, for example, 655 experimental
points, your corresponding money earnings are 655 50=1000 = 32:75pence.
Your session earnings are computed by adding up the money you got during the 20 experi-
ment rounds.
4.6. But, what is q?
q is a parameter that can only take one of 3 values: A, B or C. In any given round,
your computer will choose one of these 3 values, with probabilities 0.20, 0.60 and 0.20,
respectively.
Intuitively, you can think of these probabilities in the following way: Consider an urn with
100 balls. 20 of them are labelled A, 60 Band 20 C. The value of q will be determined
by the label of one of the 100 balls in the urn, chosen randomly (by the computer).
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4.7. Is there anything I could use to make a more informed decision?
Yes, there is. Before you make a decision you will get a hint. This hint will be known
only to you and can only take one of 3 values: a, b or c. It provides some information about
the value of the unknown parameter q, as shown in the following table (and in the top-right
panel of the choice screen (gure 1)):
If hint is... ...then q is... ...with probability...
a A 1:000
b
A
B
C
0:125
0:750
0:125
c C 1:000
For any given round, your hint can be found immediately below this table in the choice
screen (gure 1).
The table may seem a bit complicated but do not worry, it is not. It simply says that if
your hint is equal to a, then you can be sure that q is equal to A. Analogously, if your hint
is equal to c, then q is equal to C. When your hint is equal to b, however, you do not know
for sure what the value of q is, but you can tell how likely each value is: q is equal to B with
probability 0.750, while it is equal to A or C with probabilities 0.125 and 0.125, respectively.
Important note: Although q is the same for you and the other participant, your hints may
di¤er from each other.
4.8. Anything else I should know before making my choice?
If you want to make some computations before choosing your action, you can press the
calculator button on the choice screen (the small square button just above the darker area
(see gure 1)). Pens and paper are available for those who prefer them: raise your hand
and an experimenter will take them to your desk.
Also, it is worth mentioning that there is no Backbutton, so please make your decisions
carefully and only press the OKor Continuebuttons when you are sure you want to
move to the next screen.
4.9. So I made my decision, what now?
After you submit your decision, you will be shown the action you chose and the payo¤
you got for the round, as well as the value that q took (see gure 2). By clicking on the
Continuebutton you will move to a new round (if there is any still to be played).
Figure 2: Results screen
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Figure 11:
4.10. And then? Is it the same over and over again?
Basically, yes. In every round, the structure is identical to the one described
above: rst a new q will be selected by the computer and you will be paired up
with another participant, then you will be assigned a hint and will have to make
a decision, and nally your payo¤ will be shown on the results screen.
You can check what happened in previous periods by taking a look at the
darker area in the bottom-right panel of the choice screen (see gure 1). It
includes information about the values adopted by q, the hints you got and the
actions you chose in earlier rounds.
Important note: Every period is like a clean slate: the value of q, the par-
ticipant you are paired up with and the hint you get may vary from round to
round, but the RULES that determine them (explained in questions 4.6., 4.1.
and 4.7.) do not. In short, rounds are independent: for example, you can think
that in every round a new urn with 100 balls -20 As, 60 Bsand 20 Cs-
is used to determine the value of q, as explained in question 4.6. Similarly, the
pairings and hints of a given round are independent of the pairings and hints of
previous rounds.
5 Questionnaire
We will ask you a few questions that will help us to further understand the
data collected in the session.
6 Payment
Finally! You will be paid a show-up fee of £ 5 plus the sum earned during
the session, as explained in question 4.5.
And that is it. Once again, thank you very much for participating!
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SHORT QUIZ
1. What is your payo¤ (in experimental points) if you choose Y, the
person paired-up with you chooses Z and q is equal to A? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. What is your payo¤ (in experimental points) if you choose Z, the
person paired-up with you chooses Y and q is equal to C? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. If your hint is equal to b, what is the probability that q is equal to A?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B Rudimentary and Sophisticated Dominance
Let us start by dening the concepts of Soft, Medium and Tough games, which are simply
the games played by the members of a group when the agency is soft, medium and tough,
respectively (i.e., they are like the game shown in table 2, with q 2 fA;B;Cg). Clearly,
these games g 2 G := fS;M; Tg depend on the type of the agency, and so both g and q are
subject to the same probabilistic process.
Based on this taxonomy of games and on the conditional probability distribution of q (shown
in table 3), two di¤erent scenarios can be identied: one in which the signals give perfect
information about the game being played (when s = a or s = c), and another one in which
precision is less than perfect (when s = b).
In the rst iteration, therefore, a player who receives a soft signal (s = a) knows for sure
that she is playing the Soft game (g = S). Furthermore, because of equation 6, she can
immediately realize that Evasion strictly dominates Compliance, the very result indicated
in part 1 of proposition 1. Following a similar argument and using equation 7, part 3 is also
proved.
When the signal is medium (s = b), though, the person does not know the actual game g that
is played, but she does know its conditional probability distribution Pr(g(q)jb) = Pr(qjb).
Thus, the game that she faces is depicted in gure 12, and her expected utility from evasion is
given by equation 9, where s is replaced by b. This expression is an increasing function of the
beliefs k0(s0), 8s0 2 S, because of the nature of the relative policy (equation 5). The worst-
case scenario for the optimizing person occurs, therefore, when k0(s0) = 0; 0 := (0; 0; 0),
such that the expected utility from evasion is Eu (Y;0jb) : Analogously, the best-case scenario
occurs when k0(s0) = 1; 1 := (1; 1; 1) and expected utility is Eu (Y;1jb). It is not di¢ cult
to see that the no-strict-dominance condition of proposition 1 (part 2) requires
Eu (Y;0jb) < u(Z) < Eu (Y;1jb) (13)
and if it is satised, a Rudimentary player will act as predicted by proposition 1.29
29Alternatively, this equation can be interpretated as follows. Let us construct a new, articial 2x2 game
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f(A|b)=1/8
k’(a)
k’(b)
f(B|b)=6/8
f(C|b)=1/8
Pr(a|A)=1/2
Pr(b|B)=1
Pr(b|A)=1/2
N
SOFT
Pr(c|C)=1/2
Pr(b|C)=1/2
MEDIUM
SOFT
TOUGH
TOUGH k’(c)
k’(b)
k’(b)
N
N
N
Figure 12: Game tree if signal is medium (s = b)
A Rudimentary player would stop her analysis here, but the Sophisticated one will continue
to the next iteration. Furthermore, the sophisticated player will realize that, if the other
member of her group is (at least) Rudimentary, then (by symmetry) she would have also
worked out that Evasion (respectively, Compliance) is the strictly dominant strategy when
the signal received is soft (a) (respectively, tough (c)). Formally, the sophisticated players
beliefs about the other persons choices will have precise numbers attached to them, namely,
k0(a) = 1 and k0(c) = 0. The expected utility will reect this: Eu (Y; (1; k0 (b) ; 0) jb) and
new worst- and best-case scenarios can be computed: Eu (Y; cjb) and Eu (Y; ejb) ;where
c := (1; 0; 0) and e := (1; 1; 0).
Depending on the position of the safe utility u(Z) with respect to the latter two, three cases
like the one in table 2, but which is a weighted average of the Soft, Medium and Tough games dened above,
A :=
P
q2Q
f (qjb)  g (q), so that the corresponding (expected) utility in each of its cells is
u
 
d; d0; E (qjb) := P
q2Q
f (qjb)  u  d; d0; q (14)
It can then be shown that u (Y; Z;E (qjb)) = Eu(Y;0jb); u (Y; Y;E (qjb)) = Eu(Y;1jb), and u (Z; Y;E (qjb)) =
u (Z;Z;E (qjb)) = u(Z); so that equation 13 implies that this Average game is a coordination game.
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can arise, of which we are interested only in the following two:30 ;31
Eu (Y; cjb) > u(Z) (17)
u(Z) > Eu (Y; ejb) (18)
The rst one indicates that even in the new worst-case scenario, the expected utility from
Evasion is higher than that of Compliance or, equivalently, that Evasion strictly dominates
Compliance. The second one, on the other hand, implies that, even in the new best-case
scenario, the expected utility from Evasion is lower than that of Compliance, and so that
Compliance strictly dominates Evasion.
By denition these two conditions are mutually exclusive, and which one of them is satised
determines the players optimal strategy: either  = (Y; Y; Z) if equation 17 holds or
 = (Y; Z; Z) if the one that holds is equation 18. These strategies are of the threshold
type (Heinemann et al. (2004), Heinemann et al. (2009)) but can be indexed by their
second component, which is the only one that di¤erentiates one strategy from the other
and corresponds to the optimal choice when the signal is medium,  (b). The value of this
component, therefore, is the one that denes the Evasion,  (b) = Y , and Compliance,
 (b) = Z, treatments. This is exactly what states the second part of proposition 2.
C Classication of subjects based on questionnaire data
The questionnaire also asked participants about the strategies they followed and the ra-
tionale behind them. This information was then used to classify them according to some
stylized characteristics, in a fashion similar to the one used by Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002).
The distribution of subjects in terms of categories and treatments is shown in table 16.
The di¤erent categories are dened as follows:32
Expected payo¤ maximizers (EPM): Those who indicated they played Y (Z) in E
(C) treatments, based on expected-payo¤ maximisation. Note that this category includes
everyone who played according to the OS strategy, even though they did not use HOBs.
30The third one does not lead to a unique solution, which goes against the spirit of the theory of global
games. The reason for the non-uniqueness is the discreteness of the model. Having continuous choices may
have avoided this problem, but at the cost (considered to be too high) of increasing the complexity of the
game and thus the noise in the observations.
31For L-treatments, the analysis is greatly simplied since other peoples choices do not a¤ect ones
decisions. Then, the equivalents of equations 17 and 18 are, respectively,
Eu(Y; b) > u(Z) (15)
u(Z) > Eu(Y; b) (16)
32Appendix D shows literal transcripts of questionnaire comments made by some subjects that are char-
acteristic of each one of these categories.
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Category GC GE LC LE All
Expected payo¤ maximizers (EPM) 10/11 8/11 5 5/13 28/40
Chance maximizers (CM) 1/2 0/3 6/7 0/8 7/20
Learners (L) 0 3 1 1 5
Mixers/Experimenters (M/E) 1 2 0 2 5
Non-independent (NI) 1 0 4 3 8
Randomizers (R) 1 2 1 0 4
Confused (C) 1 0 1/2 1 3/4
Risk-lovers (RL) 2 0 1 0 3
All 18 18 20 20 76
Note: Cells with two numbers separated by / reect uncertainty about the allocation
of some subjects to specic categories.
Table 16: Questionnaire. Classication of subjects.
Chance maximizers (CM): Those who only considered the probabilities of outcomes
being higher or lower than the safe option, without weighting them using the associated
payo¤s.
Learners (L): Those whose decisions varied in the rst periods, but chose always the
predicted action afterwards.
Mixers/Experimenters (M/E): Those that deviated just once or twice from the pre-
dictions of the OS hypothesis but, unlike the Ls, did so at times other than the rst peri-
ods (Experimenters). An alternative rationale could be that they followed a strategy such
that they evaded and complied with probabilities that usually replicated the relevant odds
((1=8; 7=8) in C treatments and (7=8; 1=8) in E ones), and so could be labelled Mixers.
Non-independent (NI): Those who (despite the instructions clearly stating that rounds
were independent from each other) followed some kind of history-dependent strategy.
Randomizers (R) (also Guessers(G)): Those who chose randomly between Y and Z.
Confused (C): Those who seemed to be (or acknowledge they were) confused.
On top of these strategies, the degree of risk aversion is expected to play a role as well. In
particular, risk aversion fosters compliance (ceteris paribus) and hence makes the Global
Game predictions easier to be satised in C treatments, but works against them in E ones.
Combining the strategies dened above and the degree of risk aversion, one can usually
categorize all subjects and nd some interesting stylized facts.
The rst one that can be stated is that categories seem to order themselves in three Dom-
inance bands according to their degree of coincidence with the Global Game predictions
(see gures 13, ??, 14 and ??). Near the top we can nd the EPMs (high dominance). In
the middle-ground there is a mixed bag of types (M=E, L; NI and C) who chose di¤erent
actions in di¤erent periods, even though they always got the same signal b. Risk lovers (RL)
are close to the top in E treatments and to the bottom in C ones, and the opposite is true
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for risk averse (RA) people.
All these results, however, are not surprising. The category that is really exciting to analyse
in detail, on the other hand, is that of the CMs, since it seems to be behind the case
with the largest deviations from predictions (that is, the LC treatment). Now, the rst
thing to notice is that in some cases CMs cannot be distinguished from EPMs, because
the observed data are consistent with the predictions of both criteria (expected-payo¤ and
probability maximisation) and the questionnaire information is vague (this is the rationale
for the ambiguity in table 16). For this very reason, the most interesting scenarios are those
where the two criteria prescribe di¤erent actions, as is the case in C treatments (the Global
Game theory/Expected Payo¤ Maximization predicts Compliance, Chance Maximization
predicts Evasion). Focusing on these treatments, it can be seen that signicant deviations
from the Global Game predictions take place, thus conrming the results of the tests that
compare the levels of dominance in C and E treatments (table 10). Also, since Chance
Maximizations prescription to evade depends on what the other person does in GC but
not in LC, it is not surprising that the degree of dominance in the former is greater than
in the latter: the uncertainty about the other persons action in GC works against the
incentives to evade and (as seen in gure 13) only RLs end up evading all periods. Since
this interdependence does not play a role in LC; the number of subjects that evade all
periods is far greater (and most of them are CMs see gure 14), and explains the huge
divergence between predictions and data (and conrms the ranking of treatments according
to Dominance found in the previous section).
D Examples of categories
Expected-Payo¤Maximizers (EPM): If the hint was a, I selected action Y; otherwise,
I selected action Z. There are only three outcomes that generate more than 654 points, and
two of them only generate a negligible increase (relative to their risk). The only way to
"gamble and win" is to play Y when the hint is b, and in that case, I am gambling that
either my "opponent" has a hint of a (very unlikely), or my opponent has a hint of b, is
risking that q is really A, and is right (also very unlikely). My risk is that my opponent
plays Z, which is safer, and that q is B or C, which is likely. The risk/reward is far too
high. When my hint is a or c the correct play is obvious - in the former case, playing Y
always nets me more than 654, and in the latter, playing Y always nets me less than 654,
no matter what my opponent does.(Subject #10, GC).
Chance Maximizers (CM): If the hint is c, the best decision is always Z with a higher
payo¤. If the hint is b, it worths choosing Y, because thereis a probablility of 0.875 getting
A or B, which are both higher than Z(654). If the hint is a, my decision is denitely Y.
(Subject #20, LC).
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Figure 13: Advanced Dominance. Subject averages. GC treatment.
Figure 14: Advanced Dominance. Subject averages. LC treatment.
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Learners (L): At rst i played it safe and went with the guarantee button z and then i
took more of a risk by chosing the y button every time i got the hint "a" or "b". because
there was a higher probability of gaining more points.(Subject #18, GE).
Mixers/Experimenters (M/E): If the hint was A, choice was Y. If the hint was C,
choice was Z. If the hint was B, 80% of the time choice was Y and 20%, B.(Subject #15,
LE).
Non-independent (NI): If the hint came up as A i always selected choice Y as I would be
better o¤ (ie gaining more money) through doing so regardless of what the other participant
chose. Conversely, if the value of q was C i always chose Z since I would be worse o¤ if i
choice Y despite what the other person selected. If the value of q came up as b i would go
systematically throught the choices Y,Y,Z. This was my order since if q=b and q=a i would
be better o¤ selecting Y and if q=c i would be better o¤ selecting Z. Since the probability
of q=b was the highest i put Y at the beginning of the order. I used my knowledge of maths
and probablities to calculate the order in which to place my choices.(Subject #2, GC).
Randomizers (R): If the hint was a then i chose Y if the hint would have been c then i
would have chosen Z. apart from this i just guessed randomly. the last 3 i thought i may as
well take the risk as it was the end of the experiment.(Subject #19, LC).
Confused (C): If the probability was lower than the other option, i chose the other option.
I did not take risks in the cases where the probability could also go for the lowest amount.
Becasue i dont know much about the probability theory so i decided to go for the safest
method.(Subject #7, LC).
Risk-lovers (RL): I chose Y every time unless I knew it was C. I was not given the hint
a at any time. The di¤erence between playing it safe and gambling with the Y option was
small enough to make the experiment slightly more fun. I knew that I could lose 579, but
only gain 421, but preferred the gamble.(Subject #7, GC).
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E Extra Tables
Da Db Dc RD AD SD
LC . 0.0000 . 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE 0.3231 0.0000 . 0.3180 0.0000 0.0000
GC . 0.0000 0.1578 0.1552 0.0000 0.0000
GE . 0.0000 0.0390 0.0418 0.0000 0.0000
LC=GC . 0.0000 0.1578 0.1552 0.0000 0.0000
LE=GE 0.3231 0.0042 0.0390 0.1920 0.0042 0.0029
LC=LE 0.3231 0.0000 . 0.3180 0.0000 0.0000
GC=GE . 0.0005 0.2170 0.4359 0.0005 0.0014
Note: Values of F-tests. Values below 5% imply the null hypothesis is rejected. Dots
mean there is no variability in data as to compute the statistics.
Table 17: Dominance tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
ERRA ERRB ERRC ERR
LC 0.3456 0.0000 0.0000 0.0518
LE 1.0000 0.1450 0.0004 0.3515
GC 0.2939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0147
GE 1.0000 0.1450 0.0010 0.2445
LC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE 0.0038 0.0000 1.0000 0.1441
GC 0.0092 0.0000 0.1575 0.0000
GE 0.0006 0.0000 0.2612 0.0092
LC=GC 0.9556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LE=GE 0.1082 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000
LC=LE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3555
GC=GE 0.0135 0.0000 0.2160 0.0112
Note: Top panel: Predicted values of dependent variable. Middle
and bottom panels: Values of F-tests. Values below 5% imply the
null hypothesis is rejected.
Table 18: Errors tests. Predictions and inter-treatment comparisons.
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